Physical perimeters are supposed to do one job: buy time and certainty. Time for response teams to act, and certainty that what you’re seeing is real.
But the most costly physical perimeter failures of the past decade show a repeatable pattern. Across airports, museums, and critical infrastructure, a boundary is only as strong as its weakest layer, and when detection, integration, or response breaks down, the price tag escalates fast.
To keep this publishable and defensible, every incident below includes a credible, publicly reported value or cost figure from major outlets or official sources. Costs are shown as reported (insured value, estimated stolen value, disclosed losses, or repair costs).
The 2019 Dresden Green Vault robbery was a case study in how perimeter resilience failures compound.
Cost (reported): Prosecutors and reporting around the trial described the stolen treasures as having a total insured value of at least €113.8 million. (AP News, 2023)
What failed: Reporting described how attackers used arson and a power outage to degrade exterior conditions and security system effectiveness ahead of entry. (The Guardian, 2019)
Key lessons: A perimeter isn’t only a fence line that stops people getting in and out. It’s also power, lighting, alarm continuity, and verified response. If one dependency fails, everything downstream inherits that weakness.
This 2025 daylight theft (and the public fallout afterward) is a modern reminder that iconic sites can still have perimeter blind spots.
Cost (reported): Coverage cited an estimated value of about €88 million (European reporting) and roughly $102 million (U.S. reporting). (Le Monde, 2025)
What failed: Post-incident reporting pointed to coverage limitations and exploitable gaps that enabled a rapid operation. But the bigger vulnerability was what happened after the breach was detected. The outcome hinges on whether the whole system can verify fast, communicate clearly, and trigger the right playbook immediately. (AP News, 2025)
Key lessons: If a perimeter lacks continuous coverage and fast verification, adversaries exploit the seams, especially during routine moments (shift changes, staffing constraints. Operators need a rehearsed “in-progress incident” response plan. Who confirms, who decides, who dispatches, and what actions happen in the first 30–120 seconds.
In high-value logistics, the security boundary isn’t a fence line, it is custody integrity and the controls around handling, transit, stops, and verification.
Cost (reported): U.S. prosecutors described the theft as involving $100 million in jewelry, calling it potentially the largest of its kind in U.S. history. (AP News, 2025)
What failed: Attackers allegedly trailed the shipment and struck when conditions were most favorable, a predictable and routine pause in the journey.
Key lessons: Treat predictability and dwell time as vulnerabilities. If routes and stops create repeatable patterns, motivated attackers plan around them. The design requirement becomes continuous monitoring, rapid verification, and a rehearsed “in-progress” response plan when custody is at risk.
Air cargo zones are classic high-impact perimeters: dense operations, multiple stakeholders, and constant handoffs.
Cost (reported): Police and reporting described a theft of more than 20 million Canadian dollars in gold and cash from Toronto Pearson. (AP News, 2024)
What failed: Reporting indicated suspects used a fraudulent waybill (shipping document) and exploited process gaps to have valuable cargo released from an airport facility.
Key lessons: Physical security is inseparable from authentication and chain-of-custody controls. The boundary can fail without a single bolt cutter if the process allows someone to look legitimate enough to walk out with the asset.
This one is a direct perimeter intrusion scenario: armed assailants breaching an active airfield environment.
Cost (reported): AP reported the targeted aircraft was carrying $32.5 million in cash. (AP News, 2023)
What failed: A heavily armed group reached the runway/controlled area, forcing a violent engagement with aviation security personnel.
Key lessons: Where consequences are high, a PIDS system must deliver early detection and fast verification.If detection only happens at the last layer, response becomes a firefight. The real design requirement is stopping the incident before attackers reach the asset.
This incident is a strong reminder that the ‘perimeter’ increasingly includes airspace and never just a solid fenceline.
Cost (reported): EasyJet said the disruption cost the airline £15 million. (Business News, 2019)
Operational impact (reported): Reporting described the suspension of around 1,000 flights and major passenger disruption during the incident. (TIME, 2019)
Key lessons: If teams can’t rapidly answer “Is this real?” with high confidence, the default response is to shut down operations. Perimeter systems must reduce uncertainty – not add noise.
In 2022, multiple electrical substations were deliberately attacked, damaging equipment and triggering a cascading outage. It’s a stark reminder that critical infrastructure doesn’t need to be “breached” to be compromised.
Cost (officially stated): Testimony submitted to the U.S. Congress reported $4.55 million to repair damage from the Moore County substation incident. (Congress.gov, 2023)
Community impact (reported): Local reporting described more than 45,000 people losing power for days after the attacks. (ABC11, 2025)
Key lessons: For critical infrastructure, perimeter strategy can’t rely on a single layer (like fencing). It needs standoff detection, layered coverage, and resilience planning.
Across seven very different environments, the same truths keep showing up:
If you’re specifying or installing perimeter intrusion detection for high-consequence sites, you should be building requirements around outcomes:
FFT’s strategy is built around the specifier’s real-world pressures: